Fordham Law Review
Volume 85

Issue 6

Article 14

2017

(Beyond) Family Ties: Remote Tippees in a Post-Salman Era
Austin J. Green
Fordham University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Austin J. Green, (Beyond) Family Ties: Remote Tippees in a Post-Salman Era, 85 Fordham L. Rev. 2769
(2017).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol85/iss6/14

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

NOTES
(BEYOND) FAMILY TIES:
REMOTE TIPPEES IN A POST-SALMAN ERA
Austin J. Green*
In Salman v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed Dirks v.
SEC, holding that a personal benefit may be inferred where an insider
discloses material nonpublic information to a “trading relative or friend.”
While the decision was viewed as a win for prosecutors, the Court’s limited
holding did little to address issues pertaining to more complex tipping
chains, such as those raised by the Second Circuit’s decision in United
States v. Newman two years prior. Particularly, a remote tippee cannot
always determine whether material nonpublic information was improperly
disclosed at the time of receipt. Such a remote tippee could not know
whether trading on the tip is lawful without further investigation, and in the
fast-paced securities industry, time is money. These scenarios also raise
issues in the courtroom, where prosecutors must prove that the remote
tippee knew, or should have known, the information was improperly
disclosed at time of the trade, and the Supreme Court has rejected the
notion that a remote tippee presumptively knows that material nonpublic
information was improperly disclosed. In response to these lingering
uncertainties, this Note proposes that the SEC adopt Rule 10b5-D, a safe
harbor rule that would encourage disclosure and promote timely decision
making without condoning insider trading.
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INTRODUCTION
An analyst and a hedge fund manager walk into a bar. The analyst tells
the manager that she heard X Corp stock is about to plunge. When asked
about where this information originated, the analyst merely states that she
received the tip from an old college friend but does not know how her
friend obtained the information. If the manager then sells the fund’s X
Corp stock holdings, will she be liable for insider trading?1 Will she go to
jail? It depends.
The manager knows that whether she may lawfully trade on the analyst’s
tip depends on whether the information was originally disclosed in breach
of a fiduciary duty.2 Absent a breach, the manager is free to trade.3
Regardless, the manager cannot know whether trading on the analyst’s tip
would be lawful without knowing more.4 Time spent investigating the facts
pertaining to the source of the information could be costly, however, as the
information’s value will decrease over time.5 However, placing the trade

1. “‘Insider trading’ is a term of art that refers to unlawful trading in securities by
persons who possess material nonpublic information about the company whose shares are
traded or the market for its shares.” 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING:
REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT & PREVENTION § 1:1 (2016).
2. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655–66 (1997); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S.
646, 662–64 (1983).
3. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662; 18 LANGEVOORT, supra note 1, § 4:10, at 4-34 n.3 (“[I]t
is necessary that the notice of the breach (i.e., intent to benefit) relate back to the insider in
order to create abstain or disclose liability.”).
4. The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the premise that a tipper who discloses
material nonpublic information necessarily does so for a personal benefit. See Dirks, 463
U.S. at 661–62.
5. See infra Part II.A.1.
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without performing a sufficient investigation could result in a court finding
that she consciously avoided learning about the potential breach.6 The
manager is thus presented with a dilemma: either she abstains from trading
with the chance of forgoing permissible profits, or she trades at the risk of
facing criminal prosecution.7
This manager’s dilemma illustrates the problem with the current insider
trading laws, particularly as applied to “remote tippees.”8 A remote tippee
commits insider trading when she purchases or sells securities on the basis
of material nonpublic information that she knows, or reasonably should
know, was disclosed in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of the
information.9 A breach occurs where the information was originally
disclosed in exchange for a personal benefit,10 which, as the U.S. Supreme
Court recently held in Salman v. United States,11 may be inferred where the
tipper discloses the information to a “trading relative or friend,” even where
nothing tangible or of pecuniary value is received in return.12
Salman was the Supreme Court’s first insider trading case in almost two
decades, but it did little to address recent issues within insider trading
jurisprudence. Almost exactly two years before the Supreme Court decided
Salman, the Second Circuit created waves when it handed down its decision
in United States v. Newman.13 In that case, the Second Circuit made two
distinctions from the Supreme Court’s landmark case, United States v.
Dirks.14 First, the court found that “the mere fact of a friendship,
particularly of a casual or social nature,” was insufficient to draw the
inference of a personal benefit to the tipper.15 Second, the court held that a

6. Even in a criminal case, the government contends that the requisite knowledge
element may be satisfied if the court finds that the manager “consciously avoided” learning
of the breach. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 36–37, Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct.
420 (2016) (No. 15-628). While the petition for writ of certiorari presented the question of
whether failure to investigate suspicious circumstances alone can satisfy the knowledge
requirement, see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Salman, 137 S. Ct. 420 (No. 15-628), the
Supreme Court declined to review that issue, see Salman v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 899
(2016).
7. See Kathleen Coles, The Dilemma of the Remote Tippee, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 181, 218
(2006) (“From the standpoint of the would-be trader who is several degrees removed from
the source of information, this leads to the remote tippee’s dilemma—whether to trade and
risk the possibility that the original source, or primary tipper, breached a duty, or whether to
refrain from trading and risk foregoing a profit or avoiding a loss in a transaction that would
have been legal.”).
8. A “remote tippee” is an actor who receives material nonpublic information
indirectly. Id. at 184 n.18.
9. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662–64; see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642,
555–66 (1997) (endorsing the misappropriation theory as a basis for establishing liability in
insider trading cases).
10. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663.
11. 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
12. Id. at 428–29 (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2
(2016) (providing a nonexhaustive list of relationships where the inference of a personal
benefit to the tipper may be drawn).
13. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
14. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
15. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452.
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remote tippee’s knowledge cannot be inferred “where the financial
information is of a nature regularly and accurately predicted by analyst
modeling.”16 The Supreme Court did not discuss these aspects of Newman
in its recent opinion.17 Thus, the legal significance of the distinctions
identified by the Second Circuit may continue to carry weight in future
cases.18
The minute distinctions identified in Newman may perpetuate the
uncertainties faced by investors who seek to trade in accordance with the
law.19 Similarly, prosecutors may find it more difficult to establish the
knowledge requirement in cases against remote tippees, and that difficulty
will only increase when the remote tippee is further removed from the
tipper.20 This will burden the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
in particular, which must already be selective in choosing cases for its
Enforcement Division to target.21 Additionally, lower courts may find it
difficult to consistently distinguish between types of relationships and
information where the inference of a personal benefit may be drawn. This
may exacerbate some courts’ tendency to implicitly enforce a fairnessbased regime22—a practice that directly contravenes explicit Supreme
Court precedent.23
16. Id. at 455.
17. See generally Salman, 137 S. Ct. 420. With regard to Newman, the Court simply
stated, “To the extent the Second Circuit held that the tipper must also receive something of
a ‘pecuniary or similarly valuable nature’ in exchange for a gift to family or friends, we
agree with the Ninth Circuit that this requirement is inconsistent with Dirks.” Id. at 428
(emphasis added) (citation omitted).
18. The weight of Newman is reinforced by the Second Circuit’s significant influence on
securities law. See Karen Patton Seymour, Securities and Financial Regulation in the Second
Circuit, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 225, 225 (2016) (noting that the Second Circuit has decided
one-third of securities decisions decided by appellate courts).
19. “[T]he remote tippee’s apparent duty to inquire is further complicated by the
necessity of determining when information is sufficiently specific and accurate so as to be
material and raise suspicions that it emanated from a tainted source, not from general
market-place rumors.” Coles, supra note 7, at 216.
20. 18 LANGEVOORT, supra note 1, § 4:10 (noting that establishing “sufficient
knowledge of the insider’s personal benefit becomes considerably more difficult—especially
in the criminal context—as the chain of tippees lengthens”); Coles, supra note 7, at 219
n.232 (“As the information moves down the chain of tippees . . . the evidence of a close
relationship with the primary tipper typically attenuates and then disappears from the mix of
circumstantial evidence.”); see also United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 372
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[O]ne can imagine cases where a remote tippee’s knowledge that the
tipper was receiving some sort of benefit might be difficult to prove.”).
21. “The typical insider trader is never caught or prosecuted, for the costs in manpower
and resources of investigation and litigation are extremely high in this area.” 18
LANGEVOORT, supra note 1, § 1:13 (noting that formal investigations were actually initiated
in only 203 out of 83,000 business events in 1985 and 1986 where the possibility of insider
trading was present).
22. Coles, supra note 7, at 208, 211 (noting that lower courts have tended to interpret the
personal benefit requirement expansively and “ease[] the standards for both pleading and
proving that the primary tipper relayed nonpublic information to a primary tippee for
personal gain” (footnotes omitted)).
23. The Supreme Court has consistently rejected the fairness-based approach. See, e.g.,
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657 n.16 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233
n.16 (1980). Nevertheless, the government continues to push for the Supreme Court to
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Despite recent developments, compliance with the insider trading laws
remains difficult and unpredictable.24 While some have argued that the
remote tippee’s dilemma is easily resolved under a fairness-based
approach,25 such a rule would be inconsistent with congressional intent and
Supreme Court precedent.26 Alternatively, this Note proposes a solution to
alleviate the uncertainties regarding remote tippees where it is not readily
apparent whether the inference of a personal benefit to the tipper may be
drawn. Part I analyzes the evolution of insider trading jurisprudence. Then,
Part II addresses the arguments for and against the insider trading
prohibition as well as various tests and approaches under which remote
tippees may be held liable. Finally, Part III proposes the adoption of Rule
10b5-D, a safe harbor disclosure rule that encourages disclosure and
promotes timely decision making without condoning or encouraging insider
trading or requiring any substantive changes in existing law.27
I. THE EVOLUTION OF INSIDER TRADING
The basis for insider trading liability is rooted in section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“the Exchange Act”). Section 10(b)
prohibits the use of fraudulent or manipulative devices used “in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security” and gives the SEC broad
authority to define practices that constitute such devices.28 Since the
Exchange Act’s enactment, the rules governing liability have been crafted
and refined by the SEC and federal courts to conform the act of insider
trading to section 10(b)’s fraud-prevention mandate.29
Insider trading is not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the Exchange
Act30 nor was it a practice that concerned Congress in 1934.31 To better
understand the distinction between lawful and unlawful trading on material
nonpublic information, it is helpful to understand how insider trading
compares to the practices that warranted reform. Part I.A discusses harmful
endorse a fairness-based approach. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 23–27, Salman v.
United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016) (No. 15-628).
24. See Coles, supra note 7, at 184; Roberta S. Karmel, The Relationship Between
Mandatory Disclosure and Prohibitions Against Insider Trading: Why a Property Rights
Theory of Insider Trading Information Is Untenable, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 149, 151 (1993).
25. See Coles, supra note 7, at 235–36 (suggesting that a fairness-based approach would
be easiest for average investors to comply with).
26. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657–63.
27. At least one other law review article has proposed the adoption of a safe harbor rule,
though with a more limited scope. See Bernard Tsepelman, A Safe Harbor for
Communicating or Trading on Material Nonpublic Information Obtained Through
“Replicable” Methods or Strategies: Proposed SEC Rule 10b5-SH, 37 CARDOZO L. REV.
353 (2015).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012). For further discussion on section 10(b), see infra notes 81–
89.
29. See infra Part I.B–D.
30. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING 25–27 (2d ed. 2007); see also Anna
Currier, Comment, The Rule of Lenity and the Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws, 5
AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 79, 92 (2015).
31. Paul G. Mahoney, The Stock Pools and the Securities Exchange Act, 51 J. FIN. ECON.
343, 344 (1999).
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practices in the securities industry that were prevalent in the years prior to
the Great Depression. Part I.B then reviews the evolution of insider trading
jurisprudence within the courts to show the development of the current rule
governing remote tippee liability. Next, Part I.C highlights attempts by
Congress and the SEC to reinforce the insider trading prohibition after
Dirks. Finally, Part I.D analyzes the Second Circuit’s opinion in Newman
and compares that to the Supreme Court’s recent Salman case.
A. The Boiling Pot
Congress enacted the Exchange Act, in part, to prevent a recurrence of
the Great Depression by prohibiting practices that posed a threat to
investors and the integrity of the market.32 However, insider trading is
fundamentally different than the harmful practices that concerned Congress
in the early 1930s.33 Furthermore, some evidence suggests the early
condemnation of insider trading may have been exaggerated to capitalize on
political momentum at the time.34
To put the act of insider trading in perspective, Part I.A.1 briefly
discusses two practices that concerned Congress and members of the public
in the early twentieth century: price manipulation and uninformed
speculation. Part I.A.2 discusses the government’s denunciation of those
practices in responding to the stock market crash of 1929.
1. Price Manipulation and Uninformed Speculation
Price manipulation is a general term for practices whereby consumers are
forced to pay a higher price for a given commodity.35 For example, a group
of investors might carry out a “corner” by purchasing a commodity’s entire
Speculation,
supply and thereafter charging monopolistic prices.36
meanwhile, is the act of “forecasting changes of value and buying or selling
in order to take advantage of them.”37 While speculation “based on an
intelligent forecast” is beneficial to the market and its participants,38
speculation performed by those lacking means and experience is harmful.39
Such practices are by no means recent phenomena; “[h]istory is strewn
with unsuccessful efforts by governments and organized religions to
proscribe speculation and price manipulation and to control commodity
32. Id.
33. While modern market regulators are primarily concerned with insider trading, “the
regulatory concern that prompted the Exchange Act was the prevention of manipulation,
uninformed trading that artificially influences stock prices.” Id.
34. Id. at 344–49.
35. For an interesting primer on several price manipulation “stratagems,” see JERRY W.
MARKHAM, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE HISTORY OF FINANCIAL MARKET MANIPULATION 3–
9 (2014).
36. See id. at 3–4.
37. STATE OF N.Y., REPORT OF GOVERNOR HUGHES’S COMMITTEE ON SPECULATION IN
SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES 3 (1909) [hereinafter HUGHES COMMITTEE REPORT].
38. See id. at 4.
39. See id. This latter form of speculation will hereinafter be referred to as “uninformed
speculation.”
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prices.”40 In the United States, price manipulation was prevalent early on,41
and some manipulative tactics had appeared in the securities market by the
early twentieth century.42
Securities manipulation was largely carried out by “crooked” stock
pools—investor groups largely comprised of various corporate insiders.43
Members of these crooked stock pools would use their privileged access to
material nonpublic information to accurately value a given security.44
Armed with substantial financial capital, crooked stock pools placed trades
that altered market activity.45 These pools manipulated market prices by
purchasing the same securities that they were selling, thereby artificially
inflating the stock’s price by creating the appearance of increased
demand.46 In reaction to the increased market activity, other investors
would purchase the security under the assumption that the increased trading
activity was an accurate reflection of the market’s valuation of the stock.47
After the stock’s market price had reached a certain height, the stock pools
would sell their shares, thereby decreasing demand and deflating the stock’s
market price.48 By collectively trading in a company’s stock to generate the
false appearance of increased activity, stock poolers profited by selling their
holdings at inflated prices, while average investors lost money by
overpaying for fraudulently overpriced stocks.49
Such manipulative tactics as those carried out by certain stock pools in
the early twentieth century caused havoc and raised concern among
government officials well before the Great Depression. For example, the
“Panic of 1907”occurred when several New York banks collapsed after a

40. MARKHAM, supra note 35, at 9.
41. See id. at 14–30.
42. See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 393 (1990) (“If securities manipulation means anything in
particular, it means conduct intended to induce people to trade a security or force its price to
an artificial level.”).
43. See COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 8 (7th ed. 2013);
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929, at 12–13 (1954); Mahoney, supra note
31, at 346, 351.
44. GALBRAITH, supra note 43, at 12–13. This provided stock pool members with an
advantage over uninformed investors because, at the time, investment banks rarely
underwrote securities. See Mahoney, supra note 31, at 350.
45. See Thel, supra note 42, at 413 (suggesting that the pools relied on “the brute force
of concentrated economic resources”); see also GALBRAITH, supra note 43, at 12–13
(“[E]ven the most devout Wall Streeter allow[ed] himself on occasion to believe that more
personal influences have a hand in his destiny. Somewhere around there are big men who
put stocks up and put them down.”).
46. See GALBRAITH, supra note 43, at 79 (“During 1929 more than a hundred issues on
the New York Stock Exchange were subject to manipulative operations, in which members
of the Exchange or their partners had participated.”). For an oft-cited description of a classic
stock pool, see id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See Mahoney, supra note 31, at 351 (“To the extent that pool participants were not
merely informed, but company insiders, a modern commentator would condemn these pools
for facilitating insider trading. While this is a current concern, it was not the Senate’s
concern in 1934. Congress condemned manipulation, not insider trading.”).
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group of investors failed “to corner the market in the stock of a copper
mining company they controlled,” causing a small recession.50
Subsequently, a rumor circulated among the public that Wall Street had
gone crooked; word had it that corporate insiders had fraudulently inflated
stock prices to profit at the expense of unknowing investors.51 While
proposals for stock market reform failed to gain traction in Congress, New
York Governor Charles Hughes appointed a committee (“the Hughes
Committee”) to conduct an investigation into practices at the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE).52 The Hughes Committee’s goal was to identify
harmful practices and determine whether any specific regulations could
efficiently deter such harmful behavior.53
The Hughes Committee report on its investigation was primarily
concerned with “speculation,” which it defined as “forecasting changes of
value and buying or selling in order to take advantage of them.”54 The
report distinguished between speculation carried on by “persons of means
and experience, and based on intelligent forecast,” which it found
accomplished “an amount of good which offsets much of its cost,” and
speculation performed by persons without means or experience
(uninformed speculation),55 which the Hughes Committee found had the
potential to cause “an almost incalculable amount of evil.”56 The Hughes
Committee believed it was necessary to prevent uninformed speculation
while preserving the benefits of informed speculation.57 The Hughes
Committee recommended against government intervention,58 however,
recognizing the “practical impossibility of distinguishing between what is
virtually gambling from legitimate speculation.”59 Instead of enacting rigid
statutes that might hamper proper transactions, the Hughes Committee
believed that the NYSE could better address harmful practices.60 Despite
the Hughes Committee’s caution, however, reformers used the critique of
speculative practices to increase support for stock market reform.61

50. Thel, supra note 42, at 395–97. See generally ROBERT F. BRUNER & SEAN D. CAR,
THE PANIC OF 1907 (2007).
51. See Thel, supra note 42, at 395 n.41.
52. See id. at 395.
53. HUGHES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 37, at 3.
54. Id.
55. See supra note 39.
56. HUGHES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 37, at 4.
57. “The most fruitful policy will be found in measures which will lessen speculation by
persons not qualified to engage in it.” Id.
58. “No law, the [Hughes] Committee argued, could clearly distinguish between
appropriate and inappropriate transactions, and any effort to reform the exchanges by statute
would hobble and eventually destroy the market.” Thel, supra note 42, at 400.
59. See HUGHES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 37, at 4.
60. See id. at 5.
61. Thel, supra note 42, at 400–02 (“When stock market reform becomes a political
issue, the public debate has historically brushed over the question of whether reforms are
necessary and gone directly to their design: the question of what the reform should be.”).
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2. Reform Becomes Reality
The economic catastrophe that was the Great Depression saw the total
value of all NYSE-listed securities drop by roughly 83 percent between
1929 and 1932.62 While the exact cause of the Great Depression is still
subject to debate,63 many people at the time—whose memories of events
like the Panic of 1907 were still fresh—generally blamed speculators and
market makers for the stock market’s collapse.64 Despite knowing who to
blame, average investors at that time lacked legal protection against
crooked stock pools. Aside from asserting a state law fraud claim, there
were no judicial remedies available for securities manipulation victims to
pursue.65 Thus, absent some duty to the corporation, the market, or its
investors, crooked stock poolers could conduct fraudulent operations
without incurring liability.66 In the eyes of a recovering public, regulation
of the nation’s stock exchanges was necessary to prevent a relapse of the
Great Depression.67
In 1932, the Senate’s Banking and Currency Committee (SBCC) was
directed to investigate and report on stock exchange practices.68 The
investigations piqued the public’s interest once President Franklin D.
Roosevelt appointed Ferdinand Pecora as the SBCC’s chief counsel in
1933.69 Prior to his appointment, Pecora had exposed “fabulous excesses in
investment, commercial banking, and the financing of public utilities.”70
As chief counsel, Pecora hauled some of Wall Street’s largest figures before
62. See COX ET AL., supra note 43, at 7 (stating that the total value of all securities on the
NYSE fell from $89 billion to $15 billion).
63. Id.
64. See Thel, supra note 42, at 408–11. “The public eventually concluded, just as it had
after the panic of 1907, that speculators had pushed the market to unreasonable heights and
that short sales had precipitated the collapse.” Id. at 410–11; see also COX ET AL., supra note
43, at 7.
65. While state courts were successful in tackling deceptive statements and practices,
they had not yet developed a solution to securities manipulation. See Thel, supra note 42, at
407 n.96 (citing Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Liability for Stock Market Manipulation, 31 COLUM. L.
REV. 264, 272–73 (1931)).
66. See id.
Adolf Berle, who was considered one of the “most influential
commentator[s] on corporate finance” at the time, hoped that American courts would follow
English courts in curtailing securities manipulation “on the theory that it is somehow
fraudulent to trade for the purpose of creating a market price that does not represent the
trader’s own appraisal of value.” Id.
67. See id. at 409–11. “[I]n 1934 there was a widespread consensus that excessive stock
market speculation and the collapse of the stock market had brought down the economy, and
that those who enacted the Exchange Act were primarily concerned with preventing a
recurrence.” See id. at 409.
68. S. Res. 84, 72d Cong. (1932).
69. Thel, supra note 42, at 412. “[A]ny description of [the federal securities laws’]
legislative history must begin with the dramatic hearings that Mr. Pecora conducted.” Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at xiii–xiv (J. Ellenberger & E. Maher eds., 1973)). But
see Mahoney, supra note 31, at 347–48 (suggesting that Pecora “treated the brokers and
bankers who testified as accused criminals” and “presupposed the existence of wrongdoing”
to capitalize on public animosity toward Wall Street and further his own political ambitions).
70. Thel, supra note 42, at 412.
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the SBCC and repeatedly uncovered evidence that many NYSE members
participated in stock pools.71 By bringing these activities to light, Pecora
sought to capitalize on the public’s animosity toward Wall Street to
promote the President’s remedial agenda as well as his own political
ambitions.72
The Pecora hearings have been criticized for demonstrating political bias
against the witnesses73 to capitalize on the public’s infuriation with Wall
Street at the time.74 At least one scholar has argued that the SBCC’s
investigation would have been better served by hearing testimony from
prominent academics of the time “who maintained the undesirability of the
practice” rather than the bankers and executives involved.75 Another
criticism of the hearings is that the SBCC members apparently did not fully
understand the mechanics for determining the prices of financial assets.76
Regardless, the Pecora hearings undoubtedly “colored the atmosphere in
which the Exchange Act was proposed, considered, and adopted.”77
However, the harmful practices that the Pecora hearings targeted—price
manipulation and uninformed speculation—were dissimilar to insider
trading.78 In contrast to price manipulation, insider trading does not require
the creation of a false appearance of market activity. Rather, the act of
insider trading entails the use of presumptively valid information to place
the informed investor in a position to profit from the anticipation of some
imminent market event.79 Furthermore, given that informed investors are
trading on credible information, insider trading more closely resembles
informed speculation than uninformed speculation, which the Hughes
Committee feared would bring harm to the market as a whole.80 Simply
put, insider trading today is fundamentally different from the harmful
practices that concerned Congress in the years preceding the enactment of
the Exchange Act.
B. Insider Trading as Fraud
In 1934, Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act,81 in part to
prevent manipulation. 82 Section 10(b)83 was intended to serve as a catchall
71. See id. at 412–13.
72. See Mahoney, supra note 31, at 347.
73. See id.
74. See Thel, supra note 42, at 408–09.
75. HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 9 (1966). By eliciting
testimony from the wrongdoers as opposed to academics or learned reformers, the Pecora
hearings seem to have been more of a trial than an attempt to ascertain the best means by
which reform might be achieved.
76. Mahoney, supra note 31, at 348. For example, “[t]he Exchange Act was written on
the assumption that the stock market is not rational,” which is contrary to the modern
conception. Thel, supra note 42, at 410.
77. Thel, supra note 42, at 413.
78. See Mahoney, supra note 31, at 344.
79. See MANNE, supra note 75, at 77–91.
80. See supra notes 54–57.
81. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp
(2012)).
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provision to encapsulate manipulative practices not yet employed in the
stock markets.84 To accomplish this goal, section 10(b) afforded the SEC
expansive authority to define fraud in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities.85 The SEC subsequently enacted Rule 10b-5, which makes it
unlawful to
employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, [t]o make any untrue
statement of material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made . . . not misleading, or [t]o engage in
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.86

Thus, a claim brought under section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 must allege that
the claimant suffered a harm as a result of fraud in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security.87 Because insider trading is not explicitly
mentioned, let alone prohibited, anywhere in the Exchange Act,88
sustaining a claim for insider trading required a theory under which the act
of trading on material nonpublic information constituted fraud within the
meaning of section 10(b).89
In 1961, SEC Chairman William Cary proposed such a theory when the
SEC decided Cady, Roberts & Co.90 In that case, the SEC held that a
person commits fraud under section 10(b) when she breaches a fiduciary
duty owed to a corporation’s shareholders by trading on material nonpublic
information acquired by virtue of her position within the corporation.91
The SEC ruled that a corporate insider has a duty to disclose any material
nonpublic information before trading in that corporation’s securities.92
Where disclosure prior to trading is impractical, the insider must abstain

82. Mahoney, supra note 31, at 346.
83. Under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, it is unlawful
[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j.
84. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976).
85. Mahoney, supra note 31, at 344 (“The Exchange Act sought to curb manipulation by
bans on specific practices such as reporting fictitious trades, by a general prohibition on
‘raising or depressing the price of [any listed] security, for the purpose of inducing the
purchase or sale of such security by others,’ and by granting the SEC broad authority to
define and prohibit manipulative devices.” (alterations in original)).
86. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016).
87. See COX ET AL., supra note 43, at 905–06. Even after Congress enacted the
Exchange Act, insider trading actions were brought under state corporate law as common
law fraud claims until the 1960s. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 30, at 7.
88. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 30, at 25–27; see also Currier, supra note 30, at 92.
89. See COX ET AL., supra note 43, at 906 (“Much of the conceptual difficulty in the law
of insider trading is the product of a misfit between the broad fairness-based aim of the
prohibition and the narrower statutory mechanism that must be used to combat it.”).
90. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
91. Id. at 911.
92. See id.
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from trading.93 Known as the “disclose or abstain rule,” this ruling became
the foundation for the insider trading prohibition under section 10(b).94
The Supreme Court endorsed the disclose or abstain rule nearly two
decades later in Chiarella v. United States.95 Vincent Chiarella traded on
material nonpublic information he acquired from documents obtained in the
course of his profession as a printer.96 While the target corporation’s
identity had been explicitly concealed, Chiarella identified the target
corporation using other information in the documents.97
Relying heavily on the SEC’s Cady, Roberts decision, the Court held that
a corporate insider commits fraud under section 10(b) by trading on
material nonpublic information disclosed in breach of “a relationship of
trust and confidence” owed to the corporation’s shareholders.98 The breach
of such a fiduciary duty, the Court held, constituted the fraud required by
section 10(b).99 The Court’s goal was to ensure that corporate insiders did
not profit at the expense of minority shareholders.100
While endorsing the disclose or abstain rule, the Court ultimately held
that, because Chiarella was not a corporate insider, he neither received
“confidential information from the target company” nor relied on the target
corporation’s information.101 Rather, Chiarella relied on “only the plans of
the acquiring company,” and he did not owe a duty of trust and confidence
to the target corporation’s stockholders.102 The Court explained that “a
purchaser of stock who has no duty to a prospective seller because he is
neither an insider nor a fiduciary has been held to have no obligation to
reveal material facts.”103 Thus, Chiarella’s conviction was improper
because the jury instructions failed to specify whether the defendant was
subject to an affirmative duty to disclose the information prior to trading.104

93. Id. The decision in Cady, Roberts was “settled by consent and never reviewed by a
court.” MARKHAM, supra note 35, at 241.
94. See infra notes 95–100 and accompanying text.
95. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
96. See id. at 224.
97. See id. The defendant realized a gain of $30,000 over the course of fourteen months.
Id. Compared to some of the other insider trading defendants at the time, Chiarella’s profits
were meager. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 30, at 52.
98. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228–29.
99. Id. at 230.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 231.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 229. But see United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 653, 555–66 (1997)
(endorsing the “misappropriation theory,” which expanded the list of persons who incur
liability as corporate insiders to include those who owe a duty of trust and confidence to the
source of the material nonpublic information by virtue of their professional relationship,
such as lawyers and accountants). Under the misappropriation theory, Chiarella’s conviction
may have been upheld. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL SECURITIES
LAW 133–34 (3d ed. 2011) (suggesting that five of the Justices in Chiarella “would have
upheld a conviction based on a theory that the defendant was given information in a position
of trust and then wrongfully misappropriated the information to his advantage”).
104. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 229. The Court also suggested that tippees may incur liability
when they use confidential information that they know originates from a corporate insider
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Although the government advocated for the adoption of an “equal access
to information” theory, the Court explicitly rejected this theory as a basis
for the insider trading prohibition.105 Financial unfairness does not always
constitute fraud under section 10(b).106 Rather, such unfairness is only
fraudulent where there is a duty to disclose arising out of a fiduciary
relationship with the corporation’s shareholders.107 Because Chiarella was
not a fiduciary, but rather “a complete stranger,” he was not under a duty to
disclose or abstain from trading.108
The Supreme Court established in Chiarella that a claim for insider
trading under section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 requires a breach of a preexisting
duty of trust and confidence. That holding clearly precluded corporate
insiders from using their positions within their respective corporations from
profiting off information acquired in the course of their professional
responsibilities. Three years later, in Dirks v. SEC,109 the Supreme Court
discussed the application of the disclose or abstain rule to tippees—people
who lack preexisting duties to a target corporation’s stockholders but
acquire information directly from someone with inside information.110
Raymond Dirks, an officer at a New York broker-dealer firm, received
information from Ronald Secrist, a former officer at Equity Funding (EF),
suggesting that EF’s assets were vastly overstated due to fraudulent
corporate practices.111 Dirks then embarked on a two-week investigation,
discussing the information openly with fellow investors,112 clients, and the
Los Angeles bureau chief for the Wall Street Journal.113 Over the course of
Dirks’s two-week investigation, EF stock plummeted from twenty-six
dollars per share to less than fifteen dollars per share.114 The SEC

because the tippee has an obligation “arising from his role as a participant after the fact in
the insider’s breach of a fiduciary duty.” See id. at 230 n.12.
105. See id. at 232–33.
106. See id. at 232.
107. See id. The Court also rejected the “regular access to market information” test,
which would impose liability on “[a]nyone—corporate insider or not—who regularly
receives material nonpublic information” in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities. Id. at 231 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 588 F.2d 1365 (2d Cir. 1978),
rev’d, 445 U.S. 222). In the case below, the Second Circuit believed a “regular access to
market information” test would “create a workable rule embracing ‘those who occupy . . .
strategic places in the market mechanism.’” Id. at 231 n.14 (quoting Chiarella, 588 F.2d at
1365). However, the Court rejected this theory because it was “unrelated to the existence of
a duty to disclose.” Id. at 231.
108. See id. at 233–34. The idea that the “complete stranger” may escape liability has
added to the confusion over who exactly may be charged under the federal securities laws.
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 48–50, Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016)
(No. 15-628).
109. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
110. See supra note 8.
111. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 648–49.
112. Five investment advisors liquidated holdings exceeding $16 million. Id. at 649.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 650.
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subsequently launched an investigation into trades in EF securities that
occurred during Dirks’s investigation.115
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that “[a] duty [to disclose]
arises from the relationship between parties . . . and not merely from one’s
ability to acquire information because of his position in the market.”116
Thus, while identifying Congress’s intent to exempt trading that
“contribute[s] to a fair and orderly marketplace,”117 the Court also
recognized a need to ban tippee trading resulting from the exploitation of a
corporate insider’s privileged access to material nonpublic information.118
The Court stated that
[i]n holding that breaches of this duty to shareholders violated the
Securities Exchange Act, the Cady, Roberts Commission recognized, and
we agree, that “[a] significant purpose of the Exchange Act was to
eliminate the idea that use of inside information for personal advantage
was a normal emolument of corporate office.”119

Holding otherwise “would open up opportunities for devious dealings in the
name of others that the trustee could not conduct [on] his own.”120
The Court explained that, under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a tippee’s
liability derives from the insider’s duty to the corporation’s shareholders.121
Therefore, the Court ruled that a tippee commits insider trading when she
trades on material nonpublic information that was originally disclosed in
breach of a fiduciary duty.122 To determine whether a breach occurred, the
Court stated that the test was “whether the insider will personally benefit,
directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.”123 Without some personal
benefit to the insider, the Court explained, there is no breach of fiduciary
duty and thus no derivative breach by the tippee.124 Therefore, a tippee’s
liability for insider trading turns on the tipper’s intentions and the tippee’s
knowledge thereof.125
The Court overturned the judgment against Dirks because Secrist did not
disclose the information for a personal benefit.126 Rather, the Court
concluded that Secrist was motivated by a desire to expose EF’s fraudulent
115. While the Wall Street Journal’s Los Angeles bureau chief initially declined to
publish a story on Dirks’s information, the Wall Street Journal eventually released a frontpage story after the SEC launched its investigation. Id. at 649–50.
116. Id. at 657–58 (alterations in original) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 231 n.14 (1980)).
117. See id. at 657 n.16. The Court recognized that imposing a broad ban on trading on
any material nonpublic information “could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market
analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy
market.” Id. at 658.
118. Id. at 659.
119. Id. at 653 n.10 (quoting Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 (1961)).
120. Id. at 659 (quoting Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 271 (1951)).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 660.
123. Id. at 662.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 665–67.
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practices.127 Therefore, Dirks did not incur liability as a tippee because
Secrist had not disclosed the information in exchange for any personal
benefit.128
While the Dirks personal benefit test limits tippee liability to
circumstances in which information is disclosed in exchange for a personal
benefit, the Court recognized that it will not always be clear whether a
breach occurred.129 As a guiding principle, the Court instructed lower
courts to “focus on objective criteria, i.e., whether the insider receives a
direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary
gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings.”130 A
personal benefit to the tipper may be drawn where there is evidence of a
quid pro quo relationship between the tipper and primary tippee.131 Such
an inference may also be drawn, the Court stated, where the insider intends
“to benefit the particular recipient” or “makes a gift of confidential
information to a trading relative or friend.”132 However, the Court did not
precisely define what types of relationships may satisfy the “trading relative
or friend” standard.133 Thus, there may be some situations where, absent
any clear, tangible benefit to the insider, it will be difficult to determine
whether the person to whom the tipper originally discloses the information
constitutes a “trading relative or friend,” especially where that
determination must be made by a remote tippee.

127. Id.
128. Id. But see id. at 670 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The effect of Dirks’ selective
dissemination of Secrist’s information was that Dirks’ clients were able to shift the losses
that were inevitable due to the Equity Funding fraud from themselves to uninformed market
participants.”).
129. See id. at 664 (majority opinion). As the Court recently recognized, that uncertainty
lingers today. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 429 (2016) (“It remains the case
that ‘[d]etermining whether an insider personally benefits from a particular disclosure, a
question of fact, will not always be easy for courts.’” (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664)).
130. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663 (emphasis omitted); see also Victor Brudney, Insiders,
Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 322, 348 (1979) (“The theory . . . is that the insider, by giving the information out
selectively, is in effect selling the information to its recipient for cash, reciprocal
information, or other things of value for himself . . . .”).
131. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664.
132. Id. (emphasis added). “The tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself
followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.” Id.
133. Justice Harry Blackmun’s dissent illustrates the difficulty of applying the personal
benefit test:
The Court’s approach is particularly difficult to administer when the insider is not
directly enriched monetarily by the trading he induces. For example, the Court
does not explain why the benefit Secrist obtained—the good feeling of exposing a
fraud and his enhanced reputation—is any different from the benefit to an insider
who gives the information as a gift to a friend or relative. . . . Secrist surely gave
Dirks a gift of the commissions Dirks made on the deal in order to induce him to
disseminate the information. The distinction between pure altruism and selfinterest has puzzled philosophers for centuries; there is no reason to believe that
courts and administrative law judges will have an easier time with it.
Id. at 676 n.13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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C. Reinforcing Dirks
While the justification for the ban on insider trading received the
Supreme Court’s endorsement, the range of conduct proscribed by the law
was not as broad as the government had argued for.134 Following Dirks, the
government took several steps to further deter individuals from trading on
material nonpublic information. First, Congress enacted the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984135 (ITSA), which increased both the civil and
criminal penalties for insider trading.136 While ITSA illustrated Congress’s
intent to increase the severity of punishment for insider trading, it did not
alter the Supreme Court’s definition of insider trading as established in
Chiarella and Dirks.137 Nonetheless, ITSA gave the SEC greater
negotiating power in settlement talks, as evidenced by its ability to reach
more lucrative settlements.138
The SEC also promulgated three major rules to better define some of the
requisite elements of insider trading. First, the SEC promulgated
Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg FD”) in 2000, which sought to prevent
corporate insiders from disclosing material nonpublic information to select
The SEC saw selective
shareholders and market professionals.139
disclosure as a method that facilitated insider trading,140 likely because it
provides select investors with an informational advantage over the average
investor. Reg FD prevents parties from attaining such an advantage by
requiring all publicly traded companies to disclose material nonpublic
information to all investors at the same time.141
Second, Rule 10b5-1 creates a presumption that an individual trades “on
the basis of” material nonpublic information anytime that individual was
aware of the material nonpublic information when she traded.142 While this
presumption may be rebutted by any of the affirmative defenses in
subsection (c), those defenses are narrow, requiring the individual to have
had some written commitment or plan to trade on the securities in question

134. See supra notes 105–07.
135. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2012)).
136. Id. Specifically, the criminal penalty was increased tenfold, from $10,000 to
$100,000. Id. § 3, 98 Stat. at 1265. The SEC may seek both disgorgement and damages
amounting to three times the profit gained or loss avoided. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 30,
at 131. In practice, however, the SEC often varies the amount of punitive damages sought
based on the severity of the infraction. See KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART PRESTON GATES ELLIS
LLP, THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 201–02 (2d ed. 2007).
137. See HAZEN, supra note 103, at 139 (“Thus, [ITSA] does not alter the availability of a
cause of action, merely the penalties that may be imposed.”).
138. Id.
139. 18 LANGEVOORT, supra note 1, § 1:1.
140. See id.
141. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2016). However, some recent evidence suggests that similar,
yet less explicit, practices still occur. See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 454 (2d
Cir. 2014) (indicating that “analysts routinely solicit[] information from companies in order
to check assumptions in their models in advance of earnings announcements”).
142. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(b) (2016).
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prior to receiving the information.143 Thus, Rule 10b5-1 implicitly eases
the pleading and proving standards in bringing an action for insider
trading.144
Third, Rule 10b5-2 provides a nonexhaustive list of relationships in
which a duty of trust or confidence exists.145 These include situations
where there is an agreement “to maintain information in confidence,” where
the parties have routinely shared confidences with each other, and where a
person discloses information to a “spouse, parent, child, or sibling.”146
However, Rule 10b5-2’s validity has been called into question.147 While
the Supreme Court’s recent Salman decision was not inconsistent with Rule
10b5-2, the Supreme Court made no mention of the rule in its opinion.148
D. The Recent Controversy: Newman and Salman
Since Dirks, lower courts have faced difficulty in applying the personal
benefit test to cases involving remote tippees and more complex tipping
chains.149 As a result, lower courts have “eased the standards for both
pleading and proving” the requisite elements in insider trading cases.150
For example, some courts have not required “specific allegations of
personal benefit in pleadings.”151 Additionally, courts have deemed
circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish a tipper’s intentions in
disclosing information.152 Furthermore, some “courts have downplayed the
requirement of knowledge of breach of duty by repeating or emphasizing
that information has been obtained ‘improperly.’”153 This approach could
allow liability to be improperly imposed where no actual breach
occurred.154 These trends have implicitly imposed a fairness-based
approach,155 which directly contradicts explicit Supreme Court
precedent.156
In December 2014, however, the Second Circuit’s holding in United
States v. Newman157 curtailed the drifting jurisprudence.158 Todd Newman
143. See id. § 240.10b5-1(c); HAZEN, supra note 103, at 137–38. The SEC had originally
adopted a “possession test” but, after receiving comments from the public, later “reproposed
the rule to adopt the use requirement plus a presumption of use.” Id. at 137 n.609.
144. See HAZEN, supra note 103, at 137.
145. See id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b).
146. HAZEN, supra note 103, at 137.
147. See id. at 135 n.595 (citing United States v. Kim, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1035 (N.D. Cal.
2001)). “It remains difficult to define situations in which there is a sufficient duty that gives
rise to Rule 10b-5’s ‘disclose or abstain from trading’ obligation with regard to material
nonpublic information.” Id. at 134.
148. See generally Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
149. See Coles, supra note 7, at 184.
150. Id. at 208.
151. Id. at 208 n.166.
152. Id. at 208 n.167.
153. Id. at 210.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 211.
156. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657 n.16 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 233 n.16 (1980).
157. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
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and Anthony Chiasson, hedge fund managers at Diamondback and Level
Global, respectively, traded on information relayed to them by their
analysts.159 A group of analysts had shared material nonpublic information,
including earnings reports, obtained from employees of technology
companies Dell and NVIDIA.160 Rob Ray, a member of Dell’s investor
relations department, had tipped Neuberger Berman analyst Sandy Goyal,
who in turn tipped Diamondback analyst Jesse Tortora, who ultimately
relayed the information to Newman.161 Tortora also tipped Level Global
analyst Spyridon “Sam” Adondakis, who passed the tip along to
Chiasson.162 The second tipping chain originated with Chris Choi, a
member of NVIDIA’s finance unit, who tipped fellow churchgoer Hyung
Lim,163 who then tipped Whittier Trust analyst Danny Kuo.164 Kuo then
provided the information to the group of analysts, including Tortora and
Adondakis, who in turn relayed the information to Newman and
Chiasson.165 An illustration of the complex tipping chain is provided
below.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
Id.
164.
165.

See 18 LANGEVOORT, supra note 1, § 4:9.
Newman, 773 F.3d at 442.
Id. at 443.
Id. Newman was three levels removed from Ray. Id.
Id. Chiasson was four levels removed from Ray. Id.
Id. Lim was also a former Broadcom Corporation and Altera Corporation executive.
Id.
Id. Newman and Chiasson were both four levels removed from Choi. Id.
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Figure 1: Dell Tipping Chain

Figure 2: NVIDIA Tipping Chain

At the close of the government’s case in chief, Newman and Chiasson
argued that the government had failed to present any evidence that Ray or
Choi received a personal benefit in exchange for the material nonpublic
information or that either defendant knew of any such benefit.166
Alternatively, Newman and Chiasson “requested that the court instruct the
jury that it must find that Newman and Chiasson knew that the corporate
insiders had disclosed confidential information for personal benefit in order
to find them guilty.”167 Instead, the district court instructed the jury that, to
return a guilty verdict, they must find that the defendants “knew that the
material, nonpublic information had been disclosed by the insider in breach
of a duty of trust and confidence.”168 The jury subsequently found both
defendants guilty on all counts.169
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the convictions because the
government presented no evidence that either defendant was aware of any
personal benefit to Ray or Choi.170 The court found that the jury
instructions were inadequate because “a reasonable juror might have
concluded that a defendant could be criminally liable for insider trading
merely if such defendant knew that an insider had divulged information that

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 444.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
See id. at 451 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1999)).
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was required to be kept confidential.”171 Thus, the Second Circuit deemed
the convictions improper.172
The Second Circuit also stated that the inference of a personal benefit to
either Ray or Choi was impermissible.173 Both Ray and Choi were found to
have social relationships with their respective primary tippees.174 Ray and
Goyal attended business school together and also had been colleagues at
Dell.175 Goyal had also given Ray career advice and helped him with his
resume before Ray ever provided Goyal with any inside information.176
With respect to the NVIDIA chain, Choi and Lim were fellow churchgoers
who “occasionally socialized together.”177 While the Second Circuit
acknowledged that an insider may receive a personal benefit “from simply
making a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend,”178
the court rejected the notion that a personal benefit could be inferred “by
the mere fact of a friendship, particularly of a casual or social nature.”179
The Second Circuit feared that permitting the inference of a personal
benefit under such circumstances could essentially nullify the personal
benefit requirement.180
The Second Circuit also discussed whether knowledge of a breach could
be inferred from the type of the material nonpublic information. The court
acknowledged that, in general, knowledge may be inferred where the
information traded on is of a certain specificity.181 However, the evidence
suggested that the investor relations departments at Dell and NVIDIA
frequently aided analysts by affirming the accuracy of their models and by
leaking information about their earnings reports in advance.182
Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that knowledge of a breach could not
be inferred “where the financial information is of a nature regularly and
accurately predicted by analyst modeling, and the tippees are several levels
removed from the source.”183 The court further held that even where the
specificity of the information would permit inferring knowledge regarding
171. Id. at 450; see Coles, supra note 7, at 210 (“[A] generalized focus on knowledge of
‘improperly’ obtained information could allow liability to be based on improper acts that
involve no actual breach of duty by insiders.”).
172. Newman, 773 F.3d at 451.
173. Id.
174. See id. at 452–53.
175. Id. at 452.
176. See id.
177. See id. “The evidence did not establish a history of loans or personal favors between
the two.” Id. at 453.
178. Id. at 452 (quoting United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2013)).
179. Id. (emphasis added).
180. Id. (“If this was a ‘benefit,’ practically anything would qualify.”). The court also
rejected the notion that the jury could have found that Newman and Chiasson “knew the
insiders disclosed the information ‘for some personal reason rather than for no reason at all’”
because the Dirks Court “affirmatively rejected the premise that a tipper who discloses
confidential information necessarily does so to receive a personal benefit.” Id. at 454 (citing
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 661–62 (1983)).
181. Id. at 455.
182. See id. at 454–55.
183. Id. at 455.
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the information’s source, “it cannot, without more, permit an inference as to
that source’s improper motive for disclosure.”184
The Second Circuit noted that it had never considered, nor had it found
any cases where other courts had considered, a case involving tippees as far
removed from the original tipper as Newman and Chiasson.185 In stressing
the significance of the knowledge requirement, the Newman decision
illustrated the difficulty of establishing that a remote tippee several levels
removed from the source knew that the information was improperly
disclosed.186 This created some concern that prosecutions against remote
tippees would be virtually impossible to sustain.187
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Newman,188 and some scholars
believe that the Second Circuit’s holding signaled a change in insider
trading jurisprudence.189 A few months later in Salman v. United States,190
the Ninth Circuit expressed its disapproval of Newman by declining to
follow the Second Circuit’s reasoning. The Supreme Court later took up
the issue to resolve the apparent circuit split.191
Bassam Salman traded on material nonpublic information that originated
with Maher Kara, a Citigroup employee who was also Salman’s brother-inlaw.192 Maher conveyed material nonpublic information to his older
brother Michael.193 Without Maher’s knowledge, Michael relayed the
information to his friends, including Salman.194 The evidence established
that Maher intended the information to benefit his brother195 and that
Salman was well aware of Maher and Michael’s close relationship.196 At
the close of trial, Salman was convicted on one count of conspiracy to
commit securities fraud and four counts of securities fraud.197
On appeal, Salman pointed to Newman, arguing that he could not be held
liable as a tippee because “there was no evidence that Maher received

184. Id.
185. Id. at 448.
186. See 18 LANGEVOORT, supra note 1, § 4:10.
187. See id.
188. See United States v. Newman, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015).
189. See Elizabeth K. Friedrich, Insider Trading After Newman: The Impact on
Financial Institutions, J. TAX’N & REG. FIN. INSTITUTIONS, Mar.–Apr. 2016, at 23, 26 (“The
Newman court’s [decision] thus narrowed the definition of the insider’s personal benefit to
be of a pecuniary nature.”).
190. 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
191. See Salman v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016).
192. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 424.
193. Id. The evidence suggests that, initially, Maher sought Michael’s chemistry
expertise to help him grasp concepts at his new job and that Maher did not even know that
Michael was trading on the information they discussed. See id. Eventually, however, Maher
not only discovered that Michael was trading on the information, but he also continued to
provide the information to benefit Michael. See id.
194. Id. “Salman had made over $1.5 million in profits that he split with another
relative.” Id.
195. Id. at 424–25. Notably, Maher had first offered his brother money, “but Michael
asked for information instead.” Id. at 424.
196. Id. (“Michael was the best man at Maher’s wedding to Salman’s sister.”).
197. Id. at 424–25.
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anything of ‘a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature’ in exchange—or that
Salman knew of any such benefit.”198 The Ninth Circuit disagreed; Salman
could easily have inferred Maher’s intent to benefit his brother due to the
Kara brothers’ close relationship.199
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, finding that
Maher breached his fiduciary duty to Citigroup and its clients and that
Salman had full knowledge of that breach because he was well aware of the
Kara brothers’ relationship.200 Thus, the Court easily determined that
Salman incurred liability derivatively as a remote tippee.201
The Court upheld Dirks’s gift-giving standard, stating that the “gift of
inside information to a relative like Michael is little different from trading
on the information, obtaining the profits, and doling them out to the trading
relative. The tipper benefits either way.”202 The Court did not overrule
Newman, but did state that any requirement that the tipper “receive
something of a ‘pecuniary or similarly valuable nature’ in exchange for a
gift to family or friends . . . is inconsistent with Dirks.”203 The Court did
not comment on whether the relationships between the insiders and the
primary tippees in Newman were sufficient to warrant the inference that the
insider received a personal benefit in exchange for the information, nor did
the Court provide a guiding principle to distinguish between relationships
where an inference may properly be drawn from those where it may not.
Thus, even where a remote tippee has full knowledge pertaining to the
source of a tip, it will not always be clear whether a personal benefit
accrued to the tipper. Further, in cases where a remote tippee is less
acquainted with the tipper and primary tippee than Salman was with the
Mara brothers, it is not clear when a remote tippee should be expected to
have sufficient knowledge of their relationship to determine whether the
tipper personally benefitted from the disclosure.
II. REMOTE TIPPEES AFTER SALMAN
In light of the lingering uncertainties following Newman and Salman, an
investor cannot always determine whether trading on a tip is lawful. Time
spent investigating facts pertaining to the information’s source could be
costly, but the risk of trading on information that was improperly disclosed
could result in jail time for the eager trader. To determine what courses of
action may alleviate these concerns, Part II revisits the arguments for and
against a ban on insider trading and considers various possible tests for
determining a remote tippee’s liability. Part II.A summarizes the relevant

198. Id. at 425.
199. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 420.
200. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 427.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 428. However, the fact that Michael rejected Maher’s offer for money in favor
of the information suggests that the information is more valuable than its cash equivalent.
See supra note 195.
203. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 428 (emphasis added).
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arguments regarding insider trading to ascertain whether any deviation from
the existing law is warranted. Part II.B then discusses various tests and
approaches under which remote tippees could incur liability for insider
trading, as well as possible supplemental rules that could alleviate the
concerns presented by remote tippees.
A. Debating Insider Trading
A discussion of various perspectives on the insider trading ban is helpful
for understanding what goals and values a rule governing remote tippee
liability should promote. Part II.A.1 addresses the argument that insider
trading produces more efficient market prices. Part II.A.2 then presents the
arguments supporting the prohibition on insider trading. Finally, Part II.A.3
discusses public choice theory as applied to insider trading.
1. Insider Trading as an Efficient Pricing Mechanism
In 1966, law professor Henry G. Manne set forth the first major defense
of insider trading, arguing that insider trading produces more accurate
market prices.204 In an efficient capital market, a stock’s market value is a
reflection of all material and publicly available information about that
corporation and its activities.205 However, not all material information
relevant to a stock’s value is always publicly available, and therefore a
stock’s market price may not always be an accurate reflection of its true
value.206 Manne suggested that insider trading essentially compensates for
the information that is not available to the market and thereby increases
demand for the stock.207 This increase in demand causes the stock’s market
price to shift toward its true value: the stock’s market value if all material
information were publicly available.208 Manne’s theory assumes that the
informed traders are the only investors affecting the security’s demand and
that the size of their trades, in relation to the number of outstanding
securities, are significant enough to affect the stock’s overall price.209 To
that point, at least one study surveying targets of SEC enforcement actions

204. See MANNE, supra note 75, at 77–91. Manne also argued that insider trading could
serve as a compensatory mechanism. See id. at 131–41.
205. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 30, at 136. The efficient market capital hypothesis
proposes that a security’s “current price is an accurate reflection of the market’s consensus
as to the commodity’s value.” Id. at 141.
206. See id. at 136 (“The ‘correct’ price of a security is that which would be set by the
market if all information relating to the security had been publicly disclosed.”).
207. MANNE, supra note 75, at 82–83.
208. Id.
209. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 30, at 139–44. Bainbridge argues that insider trading
can only impact the security’s market price derivatively, i.e., a significant price change will
only occur after noninsiders become aware of the material nonpublic information and
observant investors trade in accordance with the initial slight changes in price. See id. at
143–44.
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during the 1980s suggests that insider trading does have an impact on a
security’s market price.210
Even where insider trading is completely unregulated, insiders will be
naturally restrained by two factors: time and wealth.211 As time goes on, a
stock’s value will gradually approach its true value because information
will gradually leak to the public before any public announcement.212 Thus,
the prospective gain (or forgone loss) that a trader may incur decreases as
time goes on.213 Even if an informed investor is able to act immediately,
the only way to realize the full value of the information is to purchase all of
the corporation’s outstanding stock.214 Therefore, even if the law did not
restrict investors from trading on material nonpublic information, investors
typically would be limited to a fraction of the information’s total value.
2. Justifications for the Ban
The mainstream argument in favor of prohibiting insider trading is rooted
in fairness. Proponents of the prohibition argue that insider trading destroys
the integrity of the stock markets by giving those with access to material
nonpublic information an unfair advantage over average investors.215 The
fear is that allowing investors to profit from such an informational
advantage at the expense of uninformed investors would ultimately
discourage investor confidence.216 However, the Supreme Court has
consistently rejected the fairness justification for prohibiting insider trading
because unfairness is not “fraudulent activity under [section] 10(b).”217
Stephen Bainbridge identifies two other types of fairness arguments in
support of a prohibition.218 First, fairness may be defined as the duty owed
by the agent to her principal; an agent should not be permitted to use her
position within a corporation for personal gain, especially at the expense of
the principal—the shareholders.219 However, this notion of fairness only
justifies the insider trading prohibition if the principal is deprived of
210. See generally Lisa Meulbroek, An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, 47
J. FIN. 1661 (1992) (finding that inside traders who were the subject of SEC actions during
the 1980s caused quick price changes by trading on material nonpublic information).
211. See MANNE, supra note 75, at 78–79.
212. See id. at 79.
213. See id. (“The time period that insiders have to capture the fresh information may
occasionally be as small as minutes . . . .”).
214. See id. at 78.
215. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 30, at 4–5, 157–58; see also HAZEN, supra note 103, at
131 (“Trading on inside information destroys the integrity of the marketplace by giving an
informational advantage to a select group of corporate insiders.”).
216. Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys. Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (“[I]t is
hard to imagine that there ever is a buyer or seller who does not rely on market integrity.
Who would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?”); see also Transcript of Oral
Argument at 23–24, Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016) (No. 15-628).
217. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233–35 (1980).
218. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 30, at 157 (citing Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462, 474–77 (1977)); see also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227 (“That the relationship between a
corporate insider and the stockholders of his corporation gives rise to a disclosure obligation
is not a novel twist of the law.”).
219. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 30, at 157.
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something, which requires there to be an assignable property interest in
material nonpublic information.220 Alternatively, fairness may be premised
on the notion that investors must not harm one another.221 On an
anonymous exchange, however, those who trade on material nonpublic
information do not cause the transacting party to purchase or sell its shares.
Thus, it is practically impossible to distinguish losses sustained or gains
forgone as the result of insider trading from those resulting from poor
investment decision making for purposes of imposing liability.222
Insider trading may also cause harm to the issuer in a variety of ways.223
Some scholars argue that any insider trading prohibition must exist to
ensure the proper maintenance of the mandatory disclosure system,224
which is arguably the chief purpose of the Exchange Act.225 Without
mandatory disclosure, officers and managers might use confidential
information for personal advantage226 and, consequently, delay disclosure
to their coworkers and the public to ensure their own profit.227 While the
time taken by one manager to trade on the information before relaying it to
her superiors may be minimal, allowing all insiders to trade on the material
nonpublic information could result in substantial delays.228 This may also
cause the corporation to incur greater administrative costs to ensure the
efficient transition of information.229 These costs would likely be
magnified if insiders were permitted to disclose material nonpublic
information to friends and family, as they would have to wait until each of
those parties had traded before relaying the information to their colleagues.
Additionally, insider trading could interfere with corporate plans.230 For
example, in the context of a merger or acquisition, trading in the securities
of the target company by insiders of the acquiring company before the offer
is made public may increase the cost of the merger or acquisition as insiders
drive up the target corporation’s stock price.231
Even more dangerous is the possibility that managers may make
decisions that will cause the greatest fluctuation in the corporation’s stock
price, allowing them to profit by purchasing or shorting the stock at the

220. See id. Bainbridge argues that “the insider trading prohibition can be justified, but
only by an economic argument that treats insider trading as theft of confidential information
in which someone other than the inside trader has a property right superior to that of the
inside trader.” Id. at 135, 172–81.
221. See id. at 158–66.
222. See id. (suggesting that investors are not likely injured by insider trading).
223. Id. at 166–72. But see Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 672 n.7 (1983) (“[I]nsider
trading generally does not injure the corporation itself.”).
224. See Karmel, supra note 24, at 169–70.
225. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 30, at 154.
226. Karmel, supra note 24, at 170–71.
227. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 30, at 156, 166–68.
228. See id. at 167.
229. See id. However, it is unclear whether corporate disclosures would be significantly
delayed under a free-trading rule due to a lack of empirical evidence. See id.
230. See id. at 168–71.
231. See id. at 168; see, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
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right time.232 This could cause managers to make decisions in accordance
with their own interests, rather than decisions in the best interests of the
shareholders. However, these concerns may be overstated because
management often has a greater incentive to maximize the corporation’s
value, which favors choosing projects with a positive net present value.233
This overriding incentive is also less likely to be outweighed by a
manager’s incentive to hamper corporate plans to benefit a remote tippee
who is unrelated to the manager.
Finally, insider trading might harm a corporation’s reputation.234 Such
reputational injury may result if prospective shareholders demand a
premium for purchasing stock in a corporation in which managers trade on
their own material nonpublic information.235 However, Bainbridge argues
that reputational harm will not materialize unless there is a “plausible
shareholder injury story,” which he asserts is difficult to create.236
3. Public Choice Theory
As applied to the insider trading ban, public choice theory suggests that
the prohibition may serve the interests of special interest groups, such as the
SEC and certain market professionals.237 If the law were to cover a broader
range of conduct, which has always captured the public’s attention, the SEC
could justifiably argue for a greater allocation of federal funds.238 Thus, the
SEC would benefit by increasing its budget to support its enforcement
program.239 Similarly, market professionals who set market prices benefit
from a rule encompassing a broader range of conduct because informed
investors profit from the market professionals’ uninformed price setting.240
However, informed investors would benefit from a narrow prohibition
because they would have more freedom to trade on information garnered
through their informational advantage.
The SEC was intended to be a neutral regulatory body, and Manne argues
that the SEC should adopt a more neutral stance on insider trading in
accordance with that role.241 However, the SEC’s numerous attempts to
ease the pleading and proof standards for sustaining a claim for insider
trading242 suggest that its stance has been more one sided than its regulatory

232. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 30, at 170–71 (“Allowing insider trading may
encourage management to select negative net present value investments . . . because failure
presents management with an opportunity for profit through short-selling.”). See generally
Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the
Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309.
233. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 30, at 171.
234. See id. at 172.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See id. at 147–54.
238. See id. at 149–50.
239. See id.
240. See id. at 150–51.
241. See MANNE, supra note 75, at 45–46, 46 n.27.
242. See supra notes 139–46 and accompanying text.
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role might call for. The Supreme Court has rejected a complete ban on
trading on material nonpublic information, noting that such a ban would
contravene congressional intent.243 The SEC would benefit from adopting
rules that accord with the Court’s holdings because it would better reflect
Congress’s intent for the SEC to serve as a neutral regulatory authority.
B. The Various Proposals for Remote Tippee Liability
The proper analysis for imposing liability on remote tippees is still open
for debate. If the courts were to deviate from the Dirks personal benefit
test, there are several possible replacements that offer varying standards for
determining a remote tippee’s liability. Part II.B.1 briefly addresses the
mechanics of a fairness test. Next, Part II.B.2 discusses the implications of
using the most restrictive reading of the personal benefit test. Part II.B.3
then addresses a slightly broader chain approach similar to the personal
benefit test, which is discussed in Part II.B.4. Finally, Parts II.B.5 and
II.B.6 discuss possible solutions that, coupled with the personal benefit test,
may alleviate the issues faced by remote tippees and government regulators.
1. Entire Fairness: A Rule Prohibiting Trading
on Any and All Material Nonpublic Information
Under a fairness rule, a remote tippee would be barred from trading on
material nonpublic information at any time. This rule would be the simplest
for courts and regulators to implement and for remote tippees to follow.244
This approach would still require a remote tippee to investigate whether the
information in question is material and nonpublic, which is not always
clear.245 However, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected the entire
fairness approach as being inconsistent with legislative intent.246 Thus,
Congress would need to enact legislation explicitly banning trading on
material nonpublic information, but, as noted by both Congress and the
Supreme Court, such a statute may hamper the role performed by many
market professionals.247
2. A Restrictive Reading of Dirks
Under a narrow reading of Dirks, a remote tippee would incur liability
only where she knows that she is the intended beneficiary.248 This
approach would likely alleviate some of the issues faced in proving
knowledge because, as the intended beneficiary, the remote tippee would
likely know (or reasonably should know) that the information was disclosed
to benefit her specifically. Such a rule would also limit liability for the
243. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657 n.16 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 233 n.16 (1980).
244. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224–25.
245. See id. at 233.
246. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657 n.16; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233 n.16.
247. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233 n.16.
248. See 18 LANGEVOORT, supra note 1, § 4:10.
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tipper, who otherwise may be held liable for trades carried out by
intermediary members of the tipping chain or subsequent remote tippees.249
This reading of Dirks would permit intermediary tippees to tip other
investors without incurring any liability,250 and there is little reason to
condone such trades that were similarly facilitated by the same improper
disclosure.251
3. The Chain Approach
The chain approach is a slightly narrower version of the personal benefit
test that would impose liability on remote tippees without the original
tipper’s intention or expectation to benefit from a tippee’s trades.252 Under
the chain approach, each tippee is treated as owing a duty of trust and
confidence to the source of the information, thus creating “a chain of
persons with a duty to disclose.”253 Under this approach, each member of
the chain would be deemed to owe a fiduciary duty to the source of the
information, and liability would exist
so long as it could be shown that each person in the chain (1) was given
the information expressly for the purpose of facilitating trading based on
inside information, (2) knew that the information was material and
[nonpublic], and (3) knew or had reason to know that it came to him as a
result of some breach of duty by an insider.254

While the chain approach focuses on the circumstances surrounding the tip
to the remote tippee, it nonetheless requires that the original tipper breach a
fiduciary duty for any of the subsequent members of the chain to incur
liability.255 Additionally, the chain approach would permit investors who
know that information was improperly disclosed to lawfully trade merely
because they were not affirmatively brought into the tipping scheme.256
This result would not serve any important policy interests nor justify a
modification in the current substantive law.
4. The Personal Benefit Test
Similar to the chain approach, the personal benefit test, established by the
Supreme Court in Dirks,257 imposes liability on a remote tippee who trades
on material nonpublic information that she knows was disclosed in
exchange for a personal benefit.258 The personal benefit test best identifies
249. See id.
250. Id. In such cases, it may be necessary to show that the remote tippee owed a duty of
trust and confidence to the primary tippee in order to be subject to liability. See id. § 4:10, at
4-34 n.2.
251. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659.
252. See 18 LANGEVOORT, supra note 1, § 4:10.
253. See id.
254. Id.
255. See id.
256. Id.
257. See supra notes 121–24 and accompanying text.
258. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983).
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situations where insiders abuse their positions within the company for
personal gain, which was the primary purpose of the SEC’s original
disclose or abstain rule.259
One interesting aspect of the personal benefit test is that success on the
merits of an insider trading claim against a remote tippee depends on
circumstances entirely outside of either party’s control. For the unknowing
investor, it does not matter whether the insider received a personal benefit
for disclosing the material nonpublic information; the resulting harm from
the remote tippee’s trading is the same.260 Whether the tip was disclosed in
exchange for a personal benefit is entirely coincidental to the uninformed
investor’s decision to trade.261 That this distinction is insignificant to the
uninformed investor yet essential to determining a remote tippee’s liability
exacerbates the need for investors to know whether or not a particular tip
was improperly disclosed at the time the investor acts on the information.
Thus, the major problem with the personal benefit test is that investors may
find it difficult to immediately comply with the law at the time they receive
material nonpublic information if they do not know all the relevant
information surrounding the initial disclosure. Solving this problem does
not require a change in the substantive law. Rather, the solution lies in
providing investors with all pertinent information to allow them to take
advantage of a tip’s time-sensitive value where trading is lawful.
5. A “Trading Relative or Friend” List
One tool that could aid investors in determining whether they may trade
on a particular tip is an exhaustive list of circumstances where the inference
of a personal benefit may be drawn. If Congress or the SEC set forth a list
of relationships that satisfy the “trading relative or friend” standard, then the
only issues for remote tippees and courts to discern would be the
relationship between the tipper and primary tippee and whether that
relationship is classified under the list.262 However, the obvious problem
with exhaustively defining every possible circumstance under which a
remote tippee should infer a personal benefit to the insider is the potential
for abuse: a creative trader could simply craft a scheme that does not
involve a proscribed relationship. Additionally, even if a governing body—
whether it be Congress, the SEC, or the courts—is able to clearly and
definitively define what constitutes a “trading relative or friend,” the
question of whether the remote tippee had, or should have had, knowledge
of the insider’s breach will always be a factual issue—one that will be more
259. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text.
260. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 30, at 158 (“It is purely fortuitous that an insider was on
the other side of the transaction.”).
261. See id. at 158–61.
262. Coles, supra note 7, at 235, nn.308–10 (arguing that clearer rules will become
necessary as more ordinary citizens start to invest directly); see also United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 570 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc); Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1198 (1995).
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difficult to prove the further the remote tippee is from the insider.263
Without that information, an investor would still be unable to determine
whether trading is lawful. Thus, enacting an exhaustive list of proscribed
relationships would not sufficiently resolve the issues faced by investors.
6. Rule 10b5-D, a Safe Harbor Disclosure Rule
Another mechanism that could alleviate the uncertainty faced by
investors presented with material nonpublic information would be the
adoption of a safe harbor disclosure rule, Rule 10b5-D. Consider the hedge
fund manager from the introduction: under Rule 10b5-D, the manager
would be permitted to trade on the analyst’s tip upon receipt of the
information so long as she files a preliminary report with the SEC within
two days of trading. In the preliminary report, the manager would be
required to provide a detailed account of all material facts pertaining to the
trade known to the investor at that time, including the details of the tip, the
number of shares purchased or sold, the amount at which the shares were
purchased or sold, and any other facts regarding the source of the
information. The investor would then be required to conduct a reasonable
investigation to determine whether the information was disclosed in breach
of a fiduciary duty. Subsequently, the manager would be required to file a
report within a reasonable time period disclosing the results of the
investigation.264 If the investigation reasonably indicates that no breach
occurred, no further action would be taken. If, however, the investor learns
that the information was disclosed in breach of a fiduciary duty, she would
be required to disgorge to the principal an amount equal to the profit gained
or loss avoided. By obtaining the preliminary and investigative reports, the
SEC would have oversight over the entire process, where it could determine
whether there are any discrepancies between the two reports and whether a
further SEC investigation is warranted. If the SEC were to find that either
of the reports misrepresented material information, the investor may incur
additional liability. This approach would retain the advantages of the
personal benefit test, promote disclosure to the SEC, and alleviate the issues
presented in situations involving remote tippees.
III. ENACTING RULE 10b5-D WILL BEST
ALLEVIATE CONCERNS
UNDER CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE
The personal benefit test properly imposes liability on remote tippees
where material nonpublic information is improperly disclosed. However,
remote tippees cannot always be expected to know whether disclosure was
improper at the time they receive a tip, and the speed at which securities are
traded today makes preemptive investigation costly and practically

263. See 18 LANGEVOORT, supra note 1, § 4:10; Coles, supra note 7, at 219 n.232.
264. The time period allocated for the investigation should be flexible and determined on
a case-by-case basis to account for tipping schemes that vary in length and complexity.
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impossible.265 Thus, while the substance of the personal benefit test is
sound, compliance is arduous in practice.
Implementing a safe harbor disclosure rule is the most effective way to
promote prompt, informed decision making without modifying substantive
law. Where a remote tippee cannot reasonably know whether material
nonpublic information was conveyed for a personal benefit, Rule 10b5-D
would permit her to act quickly to realize the full value of the information.
The safe harbor period would provide the investor time to investigate
whether the information was the product of improper disclosure. Because
the investor would not be permitted to retain any profits if her investigation,
or a subsequent SEC investigation, revealed that the information was
disclosed in breach of a duty of trust and confidence, Rule 10b5-D would
not permit the investor to profit from any informational advantage.
Rule 10b5-D provides numerous benefits to various interested parties.
First, investors will benefit from the ability to make timely investment
decisions without the risk of incurring liability. Because investment
information is time sensitive,266 investors will be permitted to act decisively
to realize the maximum possible value of a particular tip. By allowing
investors to perform the investigation after the trade has been made,
investors need not forgo time-sensitive profits by performing a potentially
lengthy investigation so long as they notify the SEC within two days of
placing the trade. If the investor later learns that the information was
obtained in breach of a fiduciary duty, then disgorgement will put the
investor back where she was before the trade, thereby depriving her of any
informational advantage gained by her access to improperly gained material
nonpublic information. Thus, investors would be permitted to make lawful
trades free from the risk of criminal prosecution without the possibility of
retaining illicit profits.
Additionally, investors presented with questionable tips will be
incentivized to use the safe harbor in exchange for immunity from potential
legal recourse. While the odds of being caught for insider trading are
low,267 the penalties are high.268 Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that at
least some investors will be incentivized to use the safe harbor disclosure
rule to avoid regulatory action and criminal prosecution even if that means
disgorging profits that they might have gotten away with otherwise.
A remote tippee’s incentive to utilize Rule 10b5-D is strengthened by an
inherent desire to avoid uncertainty in the courtroom. Because lower courts
tend to implicitly impose a fairness-based rule contrary to Supreme Court
precedent of Dirks, remote tippees could be found guilty of securities fraud

265. See Ian Domowitz & Benn Steil, Automation, Trading Costs, and the Structure of
the Securities Trading Industry, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES
33, 38–39 (Robert E. Litan & Anthony M. Santomero eds., 1999) (noting that automated
systems have become increasingly prevalent in practically all new market development
efforts).
266. See supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 21.
268. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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absent any breach of fiduciary duty.269 Rule 10b5-D would protect
investors from these deviations and better ensure the results that the
personal benefit test is intended to produce.
Further, Rule 10b5-D will serve the interests of corporations, which will
benefit from acquiring funds disgorged by investors where an investigation
reveals that information was disclosed in breach of a fiduciary duty.
Corporations have an interest in their confidential information.270 This
theory is consistent with the theory that insider trading harms a corporation
because it constitutes an abuse of a fiduciary duty owed to the corporation’s
shareholders.271 Assuming the profits are disgorged to the corporation, the
corporation may reinvest those funds in ways that may lead to an increase
in that corporation’s stock price, which would ultimately benefit the
shareholders. Thus, requiring investors to disgorge improperly obtained
profits to the corporation protects the corporation’s property interest in its
information, and recognizing a corporation’s assignable property interest in
its material nonpublic information is consistent with the original theory of
insider trading.
Rule 10b5-D will also benefit the SEC in several ways. Because the
investor performs the initial investigation, the SEC would externalize some
of its investigative expenses and receive information to which it would not
otherwise have access. This would, appropriately, place the burden on
investors because they will likely receive the greatest benefit from the rule.
The additional disclosure would also allow the SEC to police stock markets
more efficiently, as the information provided by remote tippees may help
the SEC better identify tipping chains serving as a conduit for improperly
disclosed material nonpublic information. This will ultimately help the
SEC to better identify specific individuals within those schemes, which may
increase the prohibition’s deterrent effect and stifle the flow of improperly
disclosed material nonpublic information.
Additionally, adopting Rule 10b5-D would be consistent with the SEC’s
role as a regulatory agency. The political motivations for the insider trading
prohibitions have been evident since the Exchange Act was enacted, as
evidenced by the Pecora hearings.272 Since then, the SEC has adopted rules
that effectively make claims under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 easier to
sustain.273 By adopting Rule 10b5-D, the SEC would assume a more
neutral position, in accordance with its regulatory mandate, without
condoning insider trading. Indeed, enacting Rule 10b5-D would be
consistent with the express intent of both Congress and the Supreme
Court.274
Rule 10b5-D would also preserve the integrity of the market. Absent any
breach of fiduciary duty, the corporation does not suffer a legally
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

See supra notes 149–55 and accompanying text.
See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 69–77 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 139–46 and accompanying text.
See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
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cognizable harm, and the market may benefit from exposure to material
nonpublic information before the corporation makes full disclosure.275
However, where a tip is found to have been improperly disclosed, the
integrity of the marketplace would remain intact because disgorgement
protects the corporation’s interest in its information and ensures the
informed investor does not realize any advantage from improper
disclosure.276
Rule 10b5-D would not be susceptible to abuse. Any attempt to deceive
the SEC with inaccurate preliminary or investigative reports could result in
additional liability under the federal securities laws. If the investor’s
investigation is either unreasonable or deceptive (e.g., the investigative
report concludes that the information was not obtained in breach of a
fiduciary duty, but a breach in fact occurred and the reporting party had
reason to know about it), then the investor could later incur double liability;
she may be held liable as a remote tippee under Dirks for the original trade,
and she may also be held liable for a separate count of securities fraud for
filing a fraudulent investigative report. This separate count of liability
relies on the assumption that the fraudulent investigative report constitutes
“a fraudulent or manipulative device in connection with the purchase or sale
of a security” under section 10(b).277 Additionally, the ability to perform a
lengthy investigation after trading diminishes a remote tippee’s ability to
plead ignorance with regard to whether a breach occurred.278
CONCLUSION
Despite the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Salman, there remains a
number of lingering uncertainties concerning the practical implications of
remote tippee treatment under the federal securities laws. Where an
investor lacks sufficient facts to determine whether material nonpublic
information was improperly disclosed, fear of incurring liability for insider
trading might prevent her from making a lawful trade. Time spent
investigating the requisite facts is costly, and the law should not deter or
prevent legally permissible conduct. Where trading on material nonpublic
information is not prohibited under Dirks, investors should not have to
forgo lawful profits, because they are uncertain of facts that are beyond
their knowledge or control yet pivotal in their futures. Thus, the SEC
should enact Rule 10b5-D to alleviate these concerns because it will
promote prompt, informed decision making without permitting the
exploitation of a corporation’s confidential information.
Under Rule 10b5-D, investors will be able to better make investment
decisions in compliance with the law without the risk of incurring liability
as a remote tippee. By performing an investigation after trading, investors
275. See supra notes 204–09 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text.
278. This would also alleviate concerns with regard to the government’s contention that
the knowledge requirement may be satisfied by showing that the remote tippee consciously
avoided learning about any breach. See supra note 6.
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will be able to realize the full value of a particular tip that they would
otherwise be lawfully permitted to make if they knew that the information
was not attributable to a breach of a relationship of trust and confidence. In
the event that the investor later learns that the information was improperly
disclosed, disgorgement will prevent the investor from retaining any illicit
profits. The SEC’s oversight of the investor’s investigation will prevent the
safe harbor from being abused, and the SEC will benefit by acquiring more
information that it can use to identify other tipping chains and schemes that
may otherwise go undetected. Finally, corporations that are found to have
been harmed by disloyal fiduciaries will benefit from receiving unlawfully
obtained profits through disgorgement.
Of course, this Note cannot predict how often this dilemma may arise or
in how many situations Rule 10b5-D would be beneficial. This would
present a pressing concern if Rule 10b5-D were subject to misuse.
However, the potential for additional liability will likely serve as a
sufficient deterrent against misusing the safe harbor, especially since filing
the preliminary and investigative reports under Rule 10b5-D would only
shine a spotlight on investors who might have otherwise gone undetected.
Moreover, the potential benefits that Rule 10b5-D could bestow upon
investors, corporations, the SEC, and the market in general are compelling
enough to justify its adoption.

